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Law, pliability and the multicultural city:  
Documenting planning law in action  
 
 
ABSTRACT: The urban realm is often depicted as a 
relational and unbounded place that needs to be governed 
through municipal laws designed to secure order. Focusing 
on the deployment of certain techniques central to planning  – 
e.g. development control, zoning, change of use – in this 
paper we demonstrate that this order is contingent and that 
law struggles to keep pace with the multiplicity of the urban 
realm and the conflicts that arise from the diverse lives of 
those trying to live within a dense built environment. This 
means that planning law, like other forms of municipal law  
needs to be understood as less consistent and more pliable 
than many other forms of law, being shaped by complex 
inter-legalities that emerge contextually. In this paper we 
demonstrate this with reference to the resolution of urban 
land-use conflict in Sydney (Australia) showing how 
planning decisions need to exhibit pliability within the law to 
achieve outcomes that are sensitive to local contingency. In 
conclusion we suggest that attempts to provide certainty and 
consistency in municipal law are problematic given situated 
discretion is required to produce cities more open to 
difference and diversity.  
 
KEYWORDS: legal geography, urban planning, amenity, 
locality, land use, multiculturalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
Law is sometimes idealised as abstract, rational and reasoned, involving 
thinking through issues of justice and fairness to evolve principled ways 
of deciding and resolving conflicts. As Latour (2009) noted in his 
ethnography of the Conseil D’Etat this conception of the law carries 
through to the practices of law-making itself which - in its idealized form 
- happens in purified, learned spaces where there is opportunity for 
individuals to apply high-level reasoning free from contamination or 
distraction. Law, in effect, is idealized as clean. Moreover, it is idealized 
as eternal - or at least temporally consistent. Law’s main function is the 
binding of social expectations: namely the fulfillment of social 
expectations that the law will not change from one day to another without 
legal  justification. In theory, people can then rely on law to be consistent.  
 
This is something that is particularly important in the context of cities. 
Law is depended upon to secure urban order and harmony ensuring that 
development does not impinge on the public interest and the balance 
between different potentially conflicting land uses is maintained. Without 
regulation - as many commentators have shown - cities would simply 
cease to function as spaces of production and consumption, work and 
play: it is the law that maintains the circulation of people, goods and 
things and ensures potential conflicts of land use are avoided or resolved  
(Layard 2010; Blomley 2013; Parizeau & Lepawsky 2015). The law also 
provides certainty to property owners about their rights to develop  
(Keenan 2010) and establishes the difference between public and private  
(Carr 2010). It is the law that guarantees residents that they will have 
particular levels of amenity and have legal recourse if their quiet 
enjoyment of property is compromised (Valverde 2005; Rutland 2015).  
 But herein lies the contradiction: the inherent complexity and changing 
nature of urban life means that legal definitions worked through in the 
abstract do not always seem so clear-cut when dealing with the actual 
situations that rise in cities characterized by super-diversity and cultural 
flux (Fincher et al 2014). The law has to adapt: it indulges in 
inconsistencies contradictions even paradoxes. However, it covers them 
up in its own peculiar legal way. Law is the perfect dissimulator: it 
manages to be both flexible and universal, adapting to local contingencies 
but retaining the illusion of being both universal and timeless  
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2011). This provides a strong justification 
for the pursuit of urban legal geography: studying the way that law and 
space fold into one another in the city reveals the duplicity of the law and 
the way it adapts to changing urban circumstances according the 
particularities of locality. As Bartel et al insist: 
 
Legal geography addresses … the solipsistic claim the law makes 
for its separateness and supremacy in order to understand laws as 
embedded in co-constituted social and political life that is in turn 
emplaced … Legal geography enacts a way for the heterogeneity, 
messiness, complexity, dynamism and emergent properties of 
people and place to challenge received orthodoxies of universality 
within law (Bartel et al 2013: 339).  
 
Accordingly, law and space are both conceptualised as indeterminate but 
mutually constitutive. This implies the detail of the law and its 
differential effects across varied urban circumstances must be accounted 
for through a thorough and critical analysis of how law is being applied to 
a situation place or issue in question. This requires consideration not of 
abstract principles but investigation of law in action: that is to say a 
consideration not of law in general -  as if law exists as a single entity - 
but study of the way that laws are enacted differently in different 
jurisdictions, sometimes clashing with other laws including those enacted 
at other scales. 
 
In this paper we draw on emerging ideas in legal geography that 
conceptualise law as a set of diverse practices, discourses and forms of 
knowledge which combine to produce urban space. But rather than 
focusing on the criminal laws which control the city and its citizens (i.e. 
the police powers enacted by the national state and enforced by locally-
organised police forces) in this paper we focus on the use of a diverse 
range of micro-powers used by planners to maintain the orderliness of 
urban life. Here we are guided by the work of Marianne Valverde, who 
has suggested that a great deal of the work of controlling cities is not 
carried out by acting directly on the conduct of individuals through the 
enforcement of the criminal law but occurs via municipal law, a body of 
law concerned with purposively arranging environments so as to 
encourage certain forms of conduct and discourage others. In this paper 
we therefore take municipal law to refer to those laws concerning access 
to, control over, and enjoyment of spaces, buildings, parcels of land and 
other largely material entities (Valverde 2005: 36). Municipal law shapes 
space through development control (Keenan 2010), the licensing of 
premises (Valverde and Cirak 2003), the enactment of local by-laws 
(Blomley 2010) and environmental health regulation (Koch and Latham 
2013), each of which is guided by particular rationalities and codified 
knowledges. As such municipal law is characteristically deployed by 
bureaucratic agents who have instrumentally-narrow concerns that are not 
necessarily cognisant of other bodies of law. This means that there is the 
ever-present possibility that different administrators will reach different 
conclusions about the legality of particular uses of land unless there is 
explicit coordination (Hubbard 2015).   
 
Inter-legality is thus characteristic of municipal law because of these 
sometimes competing bureaucratic modes of regulation. But municipal 
law is also inter-legal because of its multi-jurisdictional nature. Valverde 
(2016) addresses this when she notes that national or federal law 
impinges on land use and territorial dispute, albeit within the 
jurisdictional scope of local law, meaning that laws at multiple different 
levels can be invoked in land use controversies. Rights to property, 
freedom of expression or rights to development secured at the national 
level may then well clash with local laws that suggest particular land uses 
are not acceptable in a given context (Hubbard 2013). Uncertainty about 
whether local law has precedent over state or national law is often 
evident, with appeal decisions to courts at higher scales capable of 
undermining decisions made with reference to local perceptions of order 
and/or nuisance. But in other instances it is apparent that municipal 
regulators’ decisions are hard to challenge, with local authorities or city 
governors empowered to make decisions about what is legal (or not) in a 
given context by national laws that grant considerable flexibility and 
discretion to local regulators. 
 
The final important characteristic of municipal law that suggests it is 
inter-legal is that local understandings of land use (and the suitability of 
these) vary with context, history and custom. This is particularly the case 
in multi-cultural and post-secular cities where different moral and 
religious norms can clash with laws associated with the secular state 
(Humphrey 2007). If laws do not accurately represent cultural norms and 
expectations on the ground they may fail the reality test of 
implementation: one size may not fit all. However, if laws are too 
reflexive or particular then they may undermine the expectation that law 
is certain and uniformly pertaining to all. This means that generic 
concepts or categories of land use determined or defined at a national 
level (or enshrined in national legislation) become more fuzzy as they are 
invoked in land use disputes: not so fuzzy that they begin to lose meaning 
but fuzzy enough that there is room for compromise and common sense 
views to take precedent. 
 
Taken together, this inter-legality means that municipal law has a 
particular character that we describe in this paper. Here we describe 
municipal law as characterized by pliability, something evidenced in 
changing government policy, frequent judicial review and seemingly 
contradictory decisions. While all of this sits at odds with the 
predictability of (some) other forms of law we suggest that this is 
evidence of municipal law’s inevitable inter-legality and that this is 
something that needs to be understood as normal, and perhaps even 
desirable. Indeed, more perhaps than many other legal disciplines, we 
argue that municipal law has the potential of becoming more pliable, not 
more codified and straightened. In the remainder of this paper we 
demonstrate this argument with reference to some of the key concepts 
regularly invoked in urban land use disputes, showing that these can 
never be fixed but need to defined situationally. As such, we use an 
exploration of planning law in action in the context of Sydney (New 
South Wales) to make a series of more general points about the way that 
municipal law requires flexibility to promote a just, inclusive and 
cohesive society in which all can participate and where government 
services are accessible to all (see Fincher et al 2014 on planning for 
multiculturalism). A distinctive feature of Sydney’s urban environment in 
the early twenty- first century is its diversity of cultural expression and 
the provision of a multitude of places within it that provide opportunities 
for and foster a variety of cultural experiences. Indeed, Sydney has been 
hailed as a microcosm of the religious life of the world (Hartney 2004)  
and as one of the world’s pre-eminent gay-friendly cities (Marsh and 
Galbraith 1995). 
 
 
 
Enacting municipal law: planning and conflict 
 
Urban planning - as an example of municipal law in action - claims 
jurisdiction over specific spaces and objects to administer justice  
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2011). Unlike other areas of legalism 
there is a strong emphasis on concepts of justice that are more expansive 
than the social justice which stands as an enduring goal of the legal 
system for socio-legal scholars. While the notion of spatial justice is 
important here given it links questions of distributional and procedural 
justice to environmental justice (e.g. by consideration of the unequal 
burden placed on lower income and non-white communities by the siting 
of waste processing facilities in their neighbourhoods) the possibility for 
irreconcilability with some notions of social justice has long been noted  
(Bullard 2000; Pulido 1990). Here a number of key concepts provide a 
basis for judging claims to spatial justice: examples include purpose of 
use, amenity and locality. Each lies at the heart of a specific body of 
municipal law and is invoked on a regular basis in decision-making to 
justify particular arbitrations or judgments about what is right or wrong in 
a given circumstance. Given the intention of law to provide certainty, 
these concepts nonetheless remain pliable with cases in different 
jurisdictions demonstrating that such concepts - while seemingly vital to 
the regulation of urban space - can never be defined with any sense of 
precision. In the remainder of the paper we explore these concepts further 
exploring why such uncertainty is inherent to municipal law as it seeks to 
resolve land use conflicts, questioning whether this is in any sense a 
problem. 
 
 
Purpose of Use 
 
One of the most important functions of municipal law has been to 
arbitrate over uses of land. As repeatedly established in case law 
municipal law is fundamentally concerned with the use of land not with 
the identity of the user.i A use of land in this context means the use of a 
premise for a particular purposeii, something that is enshrined in land use 
classifications that characteristically distinguish between residential 
institutional business industrial and retail uses. Typically planning law 
suggests the nature of the use needs to be distinguished from the purpose 
of the use of land.iii For example, whilst a parcel of land may contain a 
car park, access road, and building, the purpose of these uses imparted to 
the land might differ greatly depending on whether it is being used as (for 
example) a place of work, a space of workshop or a place of residence. 
Within planning law it has then been concluded that: 
 
The characterization of the purpose of a use of land should be done 
at a level of generality which is necessary and sufficient to cover 
the individual activities transactions or processes carried on not in 
terms of the detailed activities transactions and processes.iv 
 This means that the law is not particularly concerned with making further 
distinctions within particular categories of use lest this brings into play 
questions that are beyond the remit of planning per se (concerned as it is 
with environmental impacts and externalities). An example here is the 
retail use of a premise: in England and Wales, for example, planning law 
does not distinguish between its use as, for example, a grocers or 
bookshop nor between a religious bookshop or one selling pornographic 
books, though the latter might invoke another set of laws concerning 
obscenity. In NSW, however, slightly different assumptions are made 
about the legality of different land uses (e.g. places of worship, retail 
markets, boarding houses, single occupation homes, brothels) within 
zones designated as, for example, commercial, business or residential. In 
this way certain assumptions are made about the environmental 
externalities associated with each type of land use, with there being a 
broad anticipation that those uses within a given category share certain 
characteristics in terms of their environmental impact and nuisances 
associated with them. 
 
In characterizing purpose of use at a level of generality planning law is an 
abstract codification and reproduction of space that imposes some 
homogeneity and hierarchically organises fragments of space according 
to classificatory logics. This characterization of purpose at a high level of 
generality nonetheless allows translation between legal abstraction and 
specific contexts (Delaney 1997). Such translations serve to tame the 
messiness and heterogeneity of everyday life and places, confining reality 
within a coldly objective system of legal calculations (Latour 2004). But 
at the same time this classification within broad categories can 
simultaneously serve the opposite purpose, allowing local regulators to 
recognize difference within sameness and respond to local contingencies 
and circumstances, enacting flexibility in the process. 
 
An example from Sydney underlines this. This case from the Land and 
Environment court (then heard in the NSW Court of Appeal) concerned 
the use of an existing premise previously used as a Presbyterian church as 
a mosque.v  Development consent had been give to the premises in 1954 
for the purpose of use as a church, but after 1995 the premise was used as 
a mosque. The local consent authority – Bankstown City Council – 
sought orders in the LEC that the use of the premises for the purpose of a 
mosque was not authorized by the 1954 consent. Summarising the view 
of the Land and Environment Court, J Stein was satisfied that the term 
church did not extend in 1954 to envisage its use as a mosque. Key to J 
Steins’ judgment were a number of dictionary definitions which he 
concluded overwhelmingly indicated that the ordinary meaning of the 
term church was restricted to Christian establishments. At appeal J Mason 
nonetheless noted that ‘whilst a dictionary may offer a reasonably 
authoritative source for illustrating usage in context, they can never enter 
the particular interpretative task confronting a person required to 
construe a particular [planning] document for a particular purpose [of 
use]’.vi In the appeal J Mason opined that the purpose of the use of land 
should be considered at a greater level of generality and not the limited 
sense implied by the first appellants’ predecessor in title [the 
Presbyterian church]. A church as understood by J Mason was part of a 
more general and composite modern Australian and British purpose of 
use as a church, chapel or other place of public worship whose common 
feature was the notion of public worship. Moreover, J Mason argued that 
the purpose of use between the Presbyterian Church era and Mosque Era 
had not changed.  
In considering this case we would argue that J Mason highlights the 
importance of the pliability of purpose of use in the law, noting that a 
more generalized liberal readingvii of purpose of use - whilst not 
boundlessviii - should prevail. This idea - that the granting of permitted 
rights for a church can extend to encompass any place of worship 
suggests purpose of use is a broad and protean concept allowing the law 
to embrace the impact of individual activities, transactions or processes 
carried on upon the surrounding locality irrespective of whether the 
premise is of Christian or Islamic denomination. This decouples 
consideration of these environmental impacts from any moral or religious 
prejudice, potentially averting the forms of opposition to mosque-
building which are grounded in Islamophobia rather than any objection 
relating to the material impacts of land use (Reeves et al 2009). Instead 
attention is focused on the way a premise might generate particular 
impacts through use. Here, J Mason notes that: 
The actual use of a particular Christian church may alter 
significantly over time. Service times may change, congregations 
may swell and liturgies and other events may become noisier or 
otherwise affect the amenity of the neighbourhood.ix 
So while planning law seeks to classify land use to direct certain 
categories of land use towards (or away) from others to avoid major 
conflicts, there remains a certain flexibility to consider the nature of use 
as distinct from the purpose of use. Here planning law exhibits sufficient 
flexibility to embrace multiculturalism, reducing questions relating to the 
religious use of land to technical questions concerning amenity, not what 
is in keeping with the character of the area (recognising those living in a 
traditionally white/Christian area might mobilise arguments against 
religious premises associated with other faiths and ethnicities).  
Amenity 
 
Amenity is one of the fundamental yet most elusive concepts in planning 
law. Though regularly invoked as the basis for particular decisions (e.g. 
refusal of planning consent because a proposed land use would be 
detrimental to residential amenity), the concept is readily understood at 
an abstract level (e.g. it refers to the pleasantness of an area) but 
extremely difficult to operationalize in practice (Cooper 2010). Stein  
(2008) notes that only matters patently remote from a proposed 
development or that are unrelated to the externalities of the proposal are 
excluded as assessment considerations by environmental and planning 
law decision-makers.x Those vague matters that are within scope are 
typically grouped within the catch-all pliable concept of amenity, making 
it both abstract and concrete at the same time. Amenity is then a socio-
legal concept sufficiently indeterminate to include a wide range of real 
and perceived effects of development that might be considered important 
in any given context. Amenity is then a wide-ranging and flexible 
concept: ‘some aspects are practical and tangible, such as traffic 
generation, noise nuisance, appearance and even the way of life of the 
neighbourhood … but others are more elusive such as the standard … of 
the neighbourhood’.xi  
 
What is meant by amenity is accordingly not clearly defined despite its 
constant referencing within planning jurisprudence.xii Stein (2008) notes 
that amenity is such a broadly encompassing notion that it is at times 
capable of incorporating public opinions that are ordinarily treated as 
matters inappropriate for planning law decision-makers to consider. He 
includes within this sphere matters of morality,xiii particularly when it is 
suggested that a change of land use or a new development of a particular 
type threatens to undermine local senses of place. But here there is 
evident flexibility in terms of the extent to which technical definitions of 
amenity extend to encompass perceptions and assumptions about 
potential impacts as opposed to actual impacts.  
 
An example of this pliability is provided by the planning decisions 
surrounding sex service premises in NSW following the legislative 
decision to decriminalise prostitution in 1995. The subsequent shift of the 
regulation of sex premises from the criminal justice system to that of 
planning following the Disorderly Houses Amendment Act 1995 
essentially stripped away any assumption that brothels are inherently 
disorderly or criminogenic (Prior et al 2012). Sex service premises in 
NSW have subsequently been located to minimize adverse physical 
impact such as noise disturbance and overlooking. In this aspect they are 
no different from other land uses in NSW when considering amenity.xiv 
However, the reforming legislation provided additional restrictions on sex 
service premise not applicable to other land-uses: for example, brothels 
are not to be placed near or within view from a church hospital school or 
other place regularly frequented by children.xv The inclusion of the 
former is telling here as while there is no necessary reason why a brothel 
as a place of work will have negative impacts on a neighbouring place of 
worship there is recognition here that the secular state’s recognition of 
sex work as legitimate employment can be out of kilter with localised 
religious and moral sentiments which regard it as inherently sinful. In this 
regard the legislation explicitly stipulates that amenity in this case needs 
to take into account questions of proximity to and visibility from 
particular land uses, suggesting that questions of amenity might be 
legitimately connected to questions of offensiveness according to local 
understandings of what might disturb this (Prior and Crofts 2012).  So 
while there is no evidence that brothels cause demonstrable nuisance to 
neighbouring populations and premises (Hubbard et al 2013), planning 
deploys pliability here to enact a more pragmatic notion of amenity which 
encompasses stigma nuisance (see Nagle 2002).  
 
Here the vague notions of near and within view within NSW legislation 
leaves the onus on local councils, in consultation with their communities, 
to create restrictions which they think are appropriate given that 
prostitution and sex work remain offensive to some. This vagueness has 
enabled local councils to generate a diversity of quantifiable planning 
principles for determining the nearness of sex service premise to specific 
facilities  (e.g. next-door, 50m away, 75m away, 200m away, not within 
the same neighbourhood or same suburb) (Harcourt 1999). In this context 
planners are able to subsume local approaches to the management of 
offense under a lexicon of planning instruments, with these planning 
instruments being understood as the direct expression of an unspoken  
assumption of who might be offended within specific local communities. 
While there are dangers here of accentuating difference, this type of 
flexibility allows planners to recognise the specificities of a given 
situation and the particular anxieties experienced among particular 
communities about the presence of sex work premise: for example, there 
have been notable instances where the increasing Islamic population in an 
area has resulted in an increasing assumption that prostitution is ‘out of 
place’ in that neighbourhood (Kingston 2013).    
 
Whilst this approach to maintaining amenity in neighbourhoods where 
sex service premises might be located has been supported since 1995 by 
the Land and Environmental Court (LEC),xvi it is apparent that the Court 
has begun to question the scope of the link between proximity and 
visibility and offensiveness. Recently, the Court approved the 
development application of a sex premise in an industrial area stating: 
 
I accept that it is likely that the nature of the use of the building 
will become known to people in the area, including to young 
people who pass the site on their way to and from the playing 
fields. However, that knowledge of itself would not in my view 
have an adverse impact on the use of the playing fields or on the 
amenity of other land in the area or on the community generally.xvii   
 
Within this recent judgment the LEC has begun to question the 
assumption of the inherent offensiveness of sex premises and how that 
may be articulated. This unpicking of the link between offensiveness and 
visibility is significant as it highlights the ways that planning law can 
accommodate changing conceptions of residential amenity across time as 
well as space. 
 
Conversely, however, objections within planning processes oftentimes 
seek to disguise moral objections to particular types of development 
within complaints about traffic car parking or more quantitatively 
calculable impacts. As such amenity concerns are presented as the key 
motivator for objection or appeal even though the objection is actually 
one about the users a land use might attract not its use per se. This was 
evident, for instance, in Protect Penrith Action Group Inc v Penrith City 
Council and Orsxviii, where those opposing the use of a building as a place 
of public worship argued that consent should be refused until a detailed 
social impact assessment describing amenity impacts could be completed. 
It was further argued - albeit unsuccessfully - that this social impact 
assessment should be grounded on seven considerations, two of which 
made specific reference to the nature of the use – a mosque - rather than 
the purpose of the use (as a place of public worship). In suggesting a need 
to gauge the nature extent and quantum of community concerns and/or 
the likely objections regarding the proposed mosque, J Moore noted that 
the social impact assessment was based on a fear of social otherness, 
highlighting that such considerations provided an impermissible taint to 
the notion of amenity.xix This decision suggested that questions of faith or 
morality should not be allowed to taint the concept of amenity, something 
that is bounded in part by the ethical requirement of judicial 
agnosticism.xx 
 
These sorts of arguments have lead scholars including Villaroman (2012) 
to argue that amenity should be objectively and scientifically evaluated – 
i.e. universalised - via the typical legal-scientific methodology of 
measurement. However, in our view fixing amenity through objective and 
scientifically evaluated measurement reiterates the grand dissimulation of 
law as abstract and universal. Amenity is not fixed - nor should it be - as 
the example of planning for brothels suggests. Rather it is a reflection of 
the specific interests and values in play at a moment in time and in place. 
Amenity cannot be counted or converted into a statement of fact because 
to do so would mean that planning law loses some of its responsiveness 
and in this sense its ability to mediate in the messiness of the 
multicultural city. Moreover, static views about such concepts can end up 
serving historically dominant classes or groups and create social spatial 
and political barriers to more recently arrived land users (Bugg 2014). 
These are barriers that are inconsistent with the dominant view of 
planning laws as being (socially) just. Further, because the conflicts that 
planning law seeks to adjudicate are ultimately intractable and the 
planning process inherently subjective, any effort at objectively declaring 
the amenity of a locality could not achieve the concurrence that is sought, 
or differentiate the moral from the technical. It would merely further 
law’s dissimulation as aspatial, abstract and universal.  
 
 
Locality 
 
Across a number of jurisdictions planning decisions are often justified 
with reference to the relevant locality (Bowes 2014). The fact that the 
spatial boundaries of a locality do not necessarily need to be defined in 
advance but can be determined contextually with reference to the facts of 
a case can be a problem for applicants as they do not have any certainty 
about the extent of the locality their development is to be considered a 
part of. Yet the latitude this gives to planning officers is valuable if one 
considers that pre-determining the boundaries of localities 
neighbourhoods or zones appropriate to particular types of land use is 
neither sufficiently responsive to the changing nature of place, nor geared 
to the changing concerns of populations whose composition alters over 
time. This fact may be contrary to what Boyer (1986: 25) describes as a 
core purpose of planning - to create certainty by removing and separating 
conflicting land uses and dysfunctional districts that might impede solid 
investments in land - but it allows for strategic pliability (see Steele and 
Ruming 2012).  
 
The ability of planning courts to recast the notion of locality within local 
planning is apparent in a series of appeals concerning land use decisions 
about gay sex-on-premises venues in Sydney in the 1990s.xxi These 
appeals highlight the often controversial situations that planning is called 
to resolve in the here-and-now, with local frames of reference sometimes 
in conflict with national legislative definitions. In the 1990s two 
development applications were submitted to South Sydney City Council 
for the Bodyline Spa and Sauna (a gay bathhouse): the first in 1992 the 
second in 1996.xxii Both were denied. These applications were both 
subsequent to the decriminalisation of homosexuality in the 1980s and at 
a time when the matter of sex premises was being transferred from 
criminal law to environment and planning law in NSW (Prior 2008).  
 
Central to the arguments for denying these development applications was 
the gay bathhouse’s detrimental affect on the amenity of the locality in 
which it was to be placed. This extended beyond concerns of mere 
nuisance to the outrage to public decency that such an establishment 
would have on the locality’s inhabitants.xxiii Central to this argument was 
a narrative of neighbourhood decline, something particularly pronounced 
in the South Sydney City Council response to the 1996 application to 
locate the bathhouse in a small side street which transitioned from 
commercial premise at one end through to a primarily residential area. 
These narratives drew a picture of a once-pristine residential 
neighbourhood being increasingly besieged and polluted by the ‘worst 
aspects of city life’.xxiv The gay bathhouse that was the focus of the 
objections was identified as only the latest addition to the many existing 
sources of pollution that existed in the messy adjoining commercial strip 
accused of generating illegal parking, drug use, sex work, and violence in 
the locality. The narratives of decline that in part guided the original 
decision to deny the development were revived and debated in 
subsequent LEC hearings.xxv Whilst there was some attempt to refer to 
statistical data to support these narratives, the evidence presented during 
the court hearings was largely anecdotal (Prior and Crofts 2012).   
 
In both hearings serious attention was given by the Court to the impact of 
the bathhouses on the locality. Whilst the arguments for denying the 
application reinforced the narratives of neighbourhood decline, the 
appellants noted that the gay community was actually prevalent in that 
particular locality. Building on the evidence presented by an expert 
witness from the AIDS Council of NSW - who argued that gay 
bathhouses had become key sites for the dissemination of information on 
safe sex practices - in the first LEC case in 1992 the judge asserted that 
the gay bathhouse was not only important but crucial for the 
establishment and maintenance of the gay community that existed within 
the surrounding locality.xxvi To reinforce this decision he noted that the 
South Sydney City Council Local Environmental Plan required 
consideration of the impact of the development on residents but did not 
define who a resident was. As a consequence he accepted that residents 
were not just the people who lived in the immediate vicinity of the 
proposed development but those living in a wider locality including the 
substantive gay community of 18,000-30,000 gay men known to live in 
the surrounding suburbs.xxvii Accordingly the judgment recast the notion 
of locality allowing the gay bathhouse to be framed as an essential local 
amenity rather than one that contributed to a locality’s decline. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our brief exploration of the enactment of key concepts in planning law 
demonstrates the epistemic and ontological tension between the 
universality, certainty and predictability of planning law sought in 
general terms and the particularity, contingency and reflexivity required 
in the multicultural city. The case studies demonstrate the ways that the 
urban realm and planning law intersect to produce particular outcomes 
that are not necessarily in keeping with repeatable interpretations of key 
concepts but can deliver what might be considered just and fair in the 
context of a city that has to be open to difference. Thus we have seen how 
the notion of purpose of use and amenity has been applied in a particular 
manner to deliver decisions rejecting theistically-biased opposition in 
NSW in some cases (e.g. to the development of sites of worship) but 
recognizing the legitimacy of moral or religious objections in others (e.g. 
to the development of brothels in proximity or view of such spaces of 
worship).  Likewise, in the case of proposals for men’s bathhouses in 
inner city Sydney the definition of a locality was interpreted much more 
widely than might normally be the case to provide sufficient room for 
manoeuvre so that past planning decisions could be reversed in the 
interests of promoting sexual rights and equalities.  
 
This also underlines the role of the diversity and multiplicity of players 
defined here as legal actants. For Latour (2004) these actants and their 
authority are – along with every other thing including institutions, bodies, 
instruments, discourses and techniques – the carriers of legal integrity 
enrolled in finding the means to link texts to cases. It is through this 
network of actants and their ceaseless mediations, adjustments and 
adaptations that planning law is enacted. So in contrast to idealising a 
transcendent legal truth (‘clean law’) we follow Latour and others in 
suggesting that law is immanent, arising in the movement between word 
and world. More significantly though, and implicit in the case studies 
recounted above, we stress the need to attend to law’s world-making 
practices as emerging inter-legally via an engagement with space, place 
and the urban environment. We are therefore wary of Latour positing one 
collective or common world of cosmopolitics because we recognize the 
critically important particularity of place. In other words the city demands 
a law that is pliable. Here pliable means singular (i.e. it can be recognised 
as law in an abstract discursive way) but acentric (i.e. not originating in 
one central disciplinary construction unfolding onto various other 
disciplines) and immanent (i.e. always emerging from the particular 
assemblage in which it is required to intervene without pre-determined 
notions yet with a consistency of approach). Perhaps most crucially, our 
consideration of planning in the multicultural city suggests that it must be 
plural (i.e. always emerging from recognition of difference and not 
identity). In cities characterized by extremes of diversity and difference, 
planning law must then resist attempts at clustering things together on the 
basis of perceived commonality instead applying itself to the unearthing 
of difference in each and every case. 
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